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Duffy: Criminal Law: Using Prior Uncounseled Misdemeamors to Enhance Pen

CRIMINAL LAW: USING PRIOR UNCOUNSELED
MISDEMEANORS TO ENHANCE PENALTIES
FOR SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES
Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994)
PatriciaDuffy
Petitioner pleaded guilty to violating a federal drug statute.' At sentencing, a federal district court considered petitioner's prior misdemeanor
conviction2 and sentenced him to twenty-five more months of imprisonment than would have been authorized if the misdemeanor had been disregarded.3 Petitioner objected to the consideration of the misdemeanor be* Dedicated to Barbara M. Duffy.
1. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1924 (1994). Petitioner pleaded guilty in 1990 to
conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988). Id.
2. See United States v. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. 277, 280 (E.D. Tenn. 1991), affld, 979 F.2d 402
(6th Cir. 1992), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994). Seven years prior to his 1990 federal drug conviction,
petitioner had been convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in Georgia. See Nichols,
114 S. Ct. at 1924 & n.1. Georgia law provided that a person convicted of DUI was guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by 10 days to one year imprisonment, by a fine of between $100 and $1,000, or
both. Id. at 1924 n.1 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391(c) (1982)). Petitioner received a $250 fine.
Nichols, 763 F. Supp. at 278.
3. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924-25. The district court used the United States Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (Guidelines) to determine the petitioner's sentence. See id. at 1924. The Guidelines seek to
punish those with a record of criminal conduct by providing the sentencing judge with a range of
months of imprisonment, the range being dependent on the "offense level" and the number of "criminal history points." See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GuIDELINEs MANUAL § 5A (Nov. 1990). Under
the Guidelines in effect at the time of petitioner's sentencing, criminal history points were tallied in
the following manner
The total points from items (a) through (f) determine the criminal history category....
(a) Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one
month.
(b) Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days not counted
in (a).
(c) Add 1 point for each prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b), up to a total of 4 points
for this item.
(d) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal
justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status.
(e) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense less than two years after
release from imprisonment on a sentence counted under (a) or (b) or while in imprisonment or escape status on such a sentence. If 2 points are added for item (d), add only I
point for this item.
(f) Add 1 point for each prior sentence resulting from a conviction of a crime of violence
that did not receive any points under (a), (b), or (c) above because such sentence was
considered related to another sentence resulting from a conviction of a crime of violence, up to a total of 3 points for this item. Provided, that this item does not apply
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cause he had not been represented by an attorney at the misdemeanor
proceeding.' He contended that the court's consideration of the misdemeanor violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.' In rejecting
petitioner's argument, the district court held that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor may be used to enhance sentencing if it does not turn the subsequent conviction into a felony with a prison term.6 Because petitioner's
previous misdemeanor did not turn the federal drug conviction into a
felony, it could be considered.' The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed on the same grounds The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, 9 and HELD that a court may consider a prior uncounseled misdemeanor in sentencing for a subsequent offense."
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence."" As a fundamental right, the Sixth Amendment's right to

where the sentences are considered related because the offenses occurred on the same
occasion.
Id. § 4Al.1. Consequently, those offenders with a record of prior criminal conduct were likely to
receive more severe punishment than those without a prior criminal record. See id. § 5A.
Under the Guidelines, petitioner's range increased from 168-210 months imprisonment to 188235 months imprisonment because of his misdemeanor. Nichols, 114 S.Ct. at 1924.
4. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. at 278.
5. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924. The district court found that petitioner had not validly waived his
right to counsel at the misdemeanor proceeding. Id. If petitioner had intelligently and competently
waived his right to counsel, he would not have been able to later assert a violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463-65 (1938).
6. See Nichols, 763 F. Supp. at 279.
7. See id. at 279-80.
8. United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 415-18 (6th Cir. 1992), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
9. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1925.
10. Id. at 1928. The Court, however, limited its holding to those uncounseled misdemeanor convictions valid under Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), because no prison term was imposed. See
Nichols, 114, S.Ct. 1928.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This portion of the Sixth Amendment has been applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341-42. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The right to counsel has been recognized in some form for centuries but what exactly the right
encompasses has varied. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-65 (1932). For instance, at common
law, England recognized the fight to counsel for defendants charged with a misdemeanor. Id. at 60.
However, not until the late 1600s did this right extend to persons accused of treason. 1 THOMAS M.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE

POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 698 (8th ed. 1927). The right did not extend to
other felonies until 1836. Id. at 698-700. Lord Coke defended the common law rule partly on the
ground that the court itself was counsel for the defendant in felony trials. Id. at 698 n.l. At least 12 of
the 13 colonies rejected this rule, and constitutionally guaranteed the right to counsel in virtually all
criminal prosecutions. Powell, 287 U.S. at 64-65.
The drafters of the Bill of Rights later incorporated a right to counsel into the Sixth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; supra text accompanying note 11. The Court in Scott noted that it
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counsel has been made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 The qualified right of an indigent criminal defendant to
court-appointed counsel is grounded in the belief that without counsel, a
layperson is denied the fundamental right to a fair trial because he does
not have enough legal skill to protect his life or liberty in court. 3 Until
1972, this right applied to accused felons, 4 but it was unclear whether it

was unclear whether this amendment sought to guarantee court-appointed counsel or whether its drafters meant only to guarantee that an accused had the right to hire an attorney for his defense in a federal criminal prosecution. Scott, 440 U.S. at 370 (citing WILLIAM M. BEANEY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN COURTS 27-30 (1955)). Although ambiguous, this right was rarely litigated prior to the
1940s. Lily Fu, Note, High Crimes from Misdemeanors: The Collateral Use of Prior,Uncounseled
Misdemeanors Under the Sixth Amendment, Badasar, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77
MINN. L. REv. 165, 168 (1992).
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
court-appointed counsel in capital cases to all indigent defendants who are unable to defend themselves because of special circumstances. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. The "special circumstances" in Powell
included defendants' ignorance and illiteracy. Id.
Ten years later, the Court in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), confined the holding in
Powell to federal courts when it held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee a right to
counsel in state felony cases unless special circumstances, such as those in Powell, were present. See
id. at 471-73.
Although the Betts holding seemed to drastically limit the scope of the right to counsel in state
courts, the Court found "special circumstances" in every subsequent case. Robert C.L. Moffat, Judicial
Decisionas Paradigm:Case Studies of Morality and Law in Interaction, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 297, 328
(1985).
Twenty-one years later, the Court overruled Betts, thereby extending official recognition of the
right to counsel to all indigent defendants-state and federal-charged with a felony, regardless of
special circumstances. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341-45.
12. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.
13. See id. at 344-45. In Powell, the Court stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with [a] crime, he is incapable, generally, of
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69.
14. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341-42.
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applied to misdemeanants. 5 In Argersinger v. Hamlin,16 the United
States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the right to courtappointed counsel extends to all persons sentenced to imprisonment, regardless of felony or misdemeanor labels. 7
In Argersinger, a Florida trial court convicted an uncounseled indigent
of an offense punishable by up to six months imprisonment, a fine, or
both. 8 The court sentenced the petitioner to ninety days in jail. 9 On appeal,"0 the petitioner argued that without counsel, he was unable to properly defend himself."' The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction
and held that the right to court-appointed counsel extends only to trials for
offenses punishable by more than 180 days imprisonment.22
The United States Supreme Court reversed and expanded the scope of
the Sixth Amendment by holding that a defendant could not be imprisoned
for any offense unless he was represented by counsel at trial.' The Court
made no distinction between petty, misdemeanor, and felony offenses,24
stating that fundamental rights apply to all criminal trials involving imprisonment because " 'the prospect of imprisonment for however short a time
will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or "petty" matter and

15. See David S. Rudstein, The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions After
Scott and Baldasar, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 517, 523 (1982). Prior to 1972, many state courts interpreted
Gideon as giving only accused felons the right to court-appointed counsel. Id. at 523 & n.25. This
narrow interpretation of the scope of the Sixth Amendment as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment was premised on the facts in Gideon, where the defendant was convicted of a felony, not a misdemeanor. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336-37, 341. In Gideon, Justice Harlan stated that whether the right
extended to all criminal cases "need not now be decided." Id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
16. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
17. See id. at 37.
18. Id. at 26. The defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon. Id.
19. Id.
20. The petitioner brought a habeas corpus action in the Florida Supreme Court. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 26-27. The Florida Supreme Court related the Sixth Amendment right to counsel with
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and based its holding on Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968). Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 26-27. In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial extends only to trials for non-petty offenses. Duncan, 391 U.S.
at 159. Non-petty offenses include any crime punishable by more than six months imprisonment. See
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 & n.6 (1970).
23. Argersinger,407 U.S. at 37. An uncounseled defendant could be imprisoned if he had validly
waived counsel. See id.
The Court rejected the Florida Supreme Court's position that the same six-month imprisonment
dichotomy for the right to jury should be applied to the right to counsel. See id. at 30-31. The Court
noted that the six-month line drawn for the right to jury is justified because most misdemeanors are
presided over by a judge alone. See id. at 29. According to the Court, the same reasoning was irrelevant to the right to counsel. See id. Moreover, the Court found no historical support for the Florida
Supreme Court's limitation on the right to counsel, but found such support for limiting the right to
trial by jury. Id. at 30 (citing Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty FederalOffenses and the
ConstitutionalGuaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REV. 917, 980-82 (1926)).
24. See id. at 37.
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may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his
reputation.' " The Court noted that the misdemeanor system is essentially "assembly-line justice,' '" characterized by overcrowded dockets,27
overworked prosecutors,' and poor preparation by the courts.29 In this
environment, counsel is often necessary to ensure the defendant a fair
trial. Without counsel, the conviction is too unreliable to impose imprisonment.3
While making it clear that an uncounseled, indigent defendant could
not constitutionally be imprisoned without a valid waiver of the right to
counsel,32 the Argersinger court did not specify whether the right to
counsel extended to cases in which imprisonment was statutorily authorized but not actually imposed.33 Seven years later, the Supreme Court
addressed this issue in Scott v. Illinois4 and halted the gradual expansion
of the Sixth Amendment.
In Scott, an Illinois trial court convicted an uncounseled indigent of
shoplifting-an offense punishable by a maximum $500 fine, one year in
jail, or both.35 The court fined him $50.36 On appeal, the petitioner argued that Argersinger requires states to provide counsel to indigent defendants whenever imprisonment is an authorized penalty.37 The Illinois Su-

25. Id. (quoting Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 73).
26. Id. at 36.
27. See id. at 34-35 & n.4.
28. See id. at 35.
29. Id. at 34-36 (citing William E. Hellerstein, The Importance of the Misdemeanor Case on
Trial and Appeal, 28 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 151, 152 (1970)).
30. Id. at 36-37. Justice Powell, while concurring in the result, voiced his concerns that the new
rule was both over- and underinclusive. See id. at 47-50 (Powell, J., concurring). The rule was
overinclusive because it would "extend the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in cases
where the right to counsel would rarely be exercised by nonindigent defendants." Id. at 49-50 (Powell,
J., concurring). It was underinclusive because it did not provide counsel in petty cases with more complex legal issues and more serious consequences than some cases in which the sentence was some
imprisonment. See id. at 47-48 (Powell, J., concurring). However, the Court declined to consider
whether the right to counsel would extend to cases where imprisonment was not a possibility because
the facts in Argersingerinvolved imprisonment. Id. at 37.
31. See id. at 36-37.
32. See id. at 37.
33. See id. State and lower federal court interpretations of Argersinger varied. See Rudstein,
supra note 15, at 526. Some state courts concluded that an indigent had a right to court-appointed
counsel only if he, or she, was actually sentenced to prison. Id. Others concluded that any indigent
charged with a crime which statutorily authorized imprisonment had a right to court-appointed counsel.
Id.
34. 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (5-4 decision). From 1932 to 1979, the scope of the right to counsel
expanded drastically. See supra notes 11, 22, and text accompanying note 22.
35. Scott, 440 U.S. at 368; see id. at 368 n.1 (Petitioner was sentenced under ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, 16-1 (1969)).
36. Id. at 368.
37. Id. at 368-69.
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preme Court rejected this argument and held that the right to counsel does
not extend to cases where imprisonment is authorized but not imposed."
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel only applies to those who are actually imprisoned.39 The Court reaffirmed Argersinger by holding that no indigent
criminal defendant may be constitutionally sentenced to prison unless
afforded the right to counsel.' An uncounseled conviction, the Court reaffirmed, is too unreliable for the imposition of imprisonment." However, the Court limited this right to cases of actual imprisonment because extending the right to cases without actual imprisonment would create confu42
sion and substantially increase costs to the states.
While Scott limited the right to counsel to cases of actual imprisonment, the Scott Court was not concerned with the constitutionality of using
a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction where no prison sentence
was imposed to impose additional prison time upon a subsequent conviction. This was an important issue because many state recidivist statutes
and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines allowed the use of misdemeanors to
enhance subsequent penalties. 43 One year after Scott, the Court unsuccessfully attempted to clarify this issue in Baldasarv. Illinois.'
In Baldasar, an Illinois circuit court convicted an unrepresented indigent of misdemeanor theft, fined him $159, and sentenced him to one year
of probation.4 5 Six months later, the State charged him with another mis-

38. Id. at 369.
39. Id. The application of this holding presented a number of problems to prosecutors and judges,
including "time-consuming consideration of the likely sentence in each individual case before trial and
the attendant problems of inaccurate predictions, unequal treatment, and apparent and actual bias." Id.
at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell predicted these problems in his Argersingerconcurrence when he said:
The judge will ... be forced to decide in advance of trial-and without hearing the evidence-whether he will forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some sentence of
imprisonment and abandon his responsibility to consider the full range of punishments
established by the legislature. [If the judge does not appoint counsel, thus abandoning this
discretion in advance,] the first victim ... is likely to be the concept that justice requires a
personalized decision both as to guilt and the sentence. The notion that sentencing should
be tailored to fit the crime and the individual would have to be abandoned in many categories of offenses.
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 53 (Powell, J., concurring).
40. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74.
41. See id. at 373.
42. Id. at 373. The Court admitted that there was little empirical evidence for its prediction. Id. at
373 n.5.
43. See, e.g., infra note 48; supra note 3.
44. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam), overruled by Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921
(1994).
45. Id. at 223. The defendant had shoplifted three packages of bacon. Id. at 226.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol46/iss3/4

6

Duffy: Criminal Law: Using Prior Uncounseled Misdemeamors to Enhance Pen
CASE COMMENTS

demeanor theft.' At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of the prior conviction over the defendant's objection that it should not be admitted
because he was unrepresented by counsel at the prior proceeding.47 The
court's consideration of the prior misdemeanor conviction turned the
defendant's second misdemeanor theft into a felony under a state enhancement statute, and he was sentenced to prison for one to three years.'
An Illinois appellate court affirmed the sentence, reasoning that the
defendant was only being imprisoned for his second offense,49 and since
he was represented at the second proceeding," he could constitutionally
be imprisoned under Scott.5' In a per curiam opinion, the United States
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case based on the reasons set
forth in the concurring opinions.5 2
Four concurring Justices reasoned that the defendant's longer prison
sentence was a direct result of his prior uncounseled misdemeanor. 3 One
Justice concluded that this violated Scott 4 while three others concluded
that it violated Scott and Argersinger5 The longer prison sentence contravened the rationale of Argersinger which argued that uncounseled misdemeanors are too unreliable to support the severe punishment of imprisonment.5 6
The four dissenting Justices disagreed, arguing that the defendant was
being imprisoned solely because of his second, counseled, conviction. 7
They pointed out that the Court has consistently sustained recidivist laws
as penalizing only the last offense committed by the defendant." They
also reasoned that because an invalid felony conviction cannot later be
used to enhance a penalty, then conversely, a valid misdemeanor convic-

46. See id. at 223. This time, the defendant shoplifted a $29 shower head. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. Under Illinois law, a theft "not from the person" of property worth less than $150 was a
misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of one year imprisonment and a maximum fine of $1,000. Id.
(citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 7116-1(e)(1), 1005-8-3(a)(1), 1005-9-1(a)(2) (1975)). A second conviction for the same offense could be treated as a felony punishable by one to three years imprisonment.
Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1 1005-8-1(b)(5) (1975)). Both of the defendant's thefts involved
property worth less than $150. See id.

49. Id. at 223-24.
50. Id. at 231.

51. Id. at 226.
52.
229.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 224. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens concurred. Id. at 224,
Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 226-27 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 227 (Marshall, J., concurring).
See id. at 227 (Marshall, J., concurring).

57. Id. at 232 ( Powell, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677 (1895) and
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962)).
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tion may later be used to enhance a penalty. 9 Therefore, because the
defendant's first uncounseled conviction was valid under the reasoning of
Scott and Argersinger, it could be used to enhance later penalties.'
In a separate concurrence, Justice Blackmun cast the deciding vote.6"
He re-proposed a bright-line test for determining the validity of an
uncounseled misdemeanor.62 Under this test, a defendant would have a
right to counsel when charged with any offense punishable by more than
six months imprisonment, regardless of actual imprisonment. 63 Because
the defendant's first conviction was punishable by up to one year of imprisonment,64 Justice Blackmun reasoned that it was invalid, and as such,
could not be used to enhance his subsequent penalty.65
The fractured opinions in Baldasar caused confusion at both the state
and federal level.' The instant Court sought to resolve this confusion and
67
specifically overruled Baldasar.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice

59.
hance a
60.
61.
62.
dissent:

Id. at 233 (Powell, J., dissenting). An uncounseled felony conviction cannot be used to enlater penalty under the holding in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 232-33 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun had originally proposed this test in his Scott

[A]n indigent defendant in a state criminal case must be afforded appointed counsel whenever the defendant is prosecuted for a nonpetty criminal offense, that is, one punishable by
more than six months' imprisonment or whenever the defendant is convicted of an offense
and is actually subjected to a term of imprisonment.
Scott, 440 U.S. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In Scott, Justice Blackmun
agreed with the reasoning in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion that any offense punishable by more
than six months' imprisonment carries with it a societal stigma greater than a simple traffic misdemeanor. Id. at 389 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Also, Justice Blackmun recognized that this would provide a bright-line test for judges, prosecutors, and defendants to determine when indigents had a right
to counsel. Id. at 390 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. Baldasar,446 U.S. at 229.
64. See id. at 223.
65. Id. at 230 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. See Fu, supra note 11, at 175. According to Fu, Baldasar "offers no more than extremely
weak and controversial guidance to legislative bodies and lower courts." Id. at 186.
A majority of state courts interpreted Baldasaras holding that prior uncounseled misdemeanors
without valid waivers of the right to counsel may not be used to increase punishment for subsequent
offenses. Brief for the United States at 16 n.10, Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1921 (No. 92-8556). Other
courts, including the Sixth Circuit involved in the instant case, restricted Baldasar to its facts and
applied it only when a defendant's prior uncounseled conviction not resulting in imprisonment turned
a subsequent conviction into a felony. See United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 415-18 (6th Cir.
1992); United States v. Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1250
(1993); Moore v. State, 352 S.E.2d 821, 822 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 904 (1987), denial
of habeas corpus rev'd in part, Moore v. Jarvis, 885 F.2d 1565 (1lth Cir. 1989). Some courts used
Justice Blackmun's bright-line test. See, e.g., State v. Beach, 592 So. 2d 237, 239 (Fla. 1992).
67. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928. This case is unusual given the Court's rigid adherence to stare
decisis. There could be several reasons why the Court chose to overrule a case decided just fourteen
years prior. One reason could have been the different fact situations in the cases. Baldasarinvolved a
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Rehnquist agreed with the dissent in Baldasarthat an uncounseled misdemeanor valid under Scott may be used to enhance a sentence for a subsequent offense.68 The Court reasoned that enhancement statutes only punish the defendant for the last offense committed and do not change the
punishment for an earlier conviction. The instant Court also asserted
that reliance on prior misdemeanors is consistent with the traditional understanding of the sentencing process, in which judges are given broad
discretion to consider the defendant's past acts.7"
Writing for the dissent, Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for
ignoring the unreliability of an uncounseled misdemeanor.7 Justice
Blackmun argued that the instant petitioner's prior uncounseled misdemeanor directly resulted in two years imprisonment.' He advocated a
rule that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could never form the
basis for an increased term of imprisonment as more in keeping with Scott
73
and Baldasar.
As the dissenting and majority opinions show, the instant case may be

man who would be imprisoned for up to three years for stealing some bacon and an inexpensive shower head. Baldasar,446 U.S. at 223, 226. The Baldasar Court specifically mentioned the stolen items
in several places in its opinion. See id. The instant case involved a man convicted of conspiracy to
possess cocaine who previously was convicted of driving under the influence, Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at
1924, crimes more serious than pilfering pork and a cheap household implement.
The present conservative majority, consisting of several of the six Justices appointed after
Baldasar,could be another reason for the overruling. Justice Scalia, appointed in 1986, was followed
by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See Allotment of the Justices,114 S. Ct.
app. 7, 9-10 (1993); J. Bradley Horn, Case Note, Eminent Domain--Loss of All Economically Beneficial Use of Real Property Constitutesa "Taking" Within Meaning of Fifth Amendment Unless Principles of State Property and Nuisance Law Give Rise to Restrictions on Land's Use-Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct.2886 (1992), 43 DRAKE L. REV. 227, 237 n.106 (1994).
68. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1927-28. The Court rejected petitioner's assertion that defendants should at least be
warned that a misdemeanor conviction could be considered for enhancement purposes in future cases
as being too impractical. See id. at 1928.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter argued that Baldasar had no holding that could be
overruled. Id. at 1929 (Souter, J., concurring). Moreover, addressing the difficult constitutional issue
raised in Baldasarcould be avoided because the sentencing schemes in the two cases differed. Id. at
1929-30 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter focused on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines involved
in the instant case, which did not automatically enhance penalties. Id. at 1930 (Souter, I., concurring).
Rather, a defendant could rebut a presumption of past criminal activity. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Accordingly, the Guidelines did not ignore the risk of unreliability of the uncounseled conviction. Id.
(Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter argued that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when the
reliability of a past conviction is taken into consideration at sentencing. Id. at 1930 (Souter, J., concurring).
71. See id. at 1933-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun regarded the provision of
counsel as both assuring a fair trial and providing the requisite reliability. See id. at 1935 (Blackmun,
J.,
dissenting).
72. Id. at 1931, 1933 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1933, 1935-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

viewed in two different ways, each supporting opposite conclusions. 4
Under one view, the enhanced imprisonment is a direct result of an
uncounseled misdemeanor. 5 This view is based on a simple but-for
premise-but for the uncounseled misdemeanor, the defendant would not
be in jail for two additional years.76 Therefore, under Scott and
Argersinger the uncounseled misdemeanor could not constitutionally be
used to increase imprisonment.77 This view favors defendants' rights over
judicial economy and the policy underlying enhancement statutes.7"
Under another view, the enhanced imprisonment is a direct result of
the second, counseled conviction.79 This view asserts that enhancement
statutes do not impose a second punishment for the first offense; instead, a
defendant is only subject to increased punishment if he chooses to commit
a second crime."' Accordingly, the enhanced sentence comports with the
Sixth Amendment because the indigent was represented by counsel at the
second proceeding.' This view favors judicial economy and the policy
behind enhancement statutes over defendants' rights.
By choosing the latter view, 2 the instant Court preserves judicial
economy and keeps politically popular enhancement statutes intact. The
holding in the instant case does not compel states or the federal government to change their repeat-offender laws or alter their misdemeanor procedures. 3 Also, state and federal courts can deprive an indigent defendant
of counsel in any proceeding not involving imprisonment and not worry

74. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73. Actually, a third view may also be taken. This is
the view espoused by Justice Souter in his concurring opinion. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1929-31
(Souter, J., concurring).
According to Justice Souter, the use of prior valid but uncounseled misdemeanor convictions in
sentencing does not violate the Sixth Amendment as long as the defendant is afforded the opportunity
to convince the court of their unreliability. Id. at 1930 (Souter, J., concurring). This is so notwithstanding that a valid uncounseled conviction may be "a less confident indicator of guilt than a counseled
one would be." Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Because the Guidelines allow a defendant to explain the
circumstances surrounding a past conviction, they take account of the risk of the conviction's unreliability, and therefore are constitutionally valid. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). This view expands the
rationale of Argersinger and Scott, which said nothing about consideration of unreliability as a basis
for constitutionality. See id. at 1934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This view would limit the instant case
to its facts, see id. at 1931, and thereby provide no clarity to state courts.
75. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1931, 1933 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Baldasar,446 U.S. at 227
(Marshall, J., concurring).
76. See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 227 (Marshall, J., concurring).
77. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
78. For the policy underlying one type of enhancement statute, see supra note 3.
79. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927; Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting).
80. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927 (citing Baldasar,446 U.S. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
81. See id. at 1928.
82. See id. at 1927-28.
83. See id. However, states may decide independently to do so. Id. at 1928 n.12.
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about the effect this deprivation will have on any future proceeding.84
This view also avoids disparate treatment of defendants under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. 5 If the former view had been chosen, defendants
in jurisdictions which routinely provide counsel in all misdemeanor cases
would be treated differently from defendants in jurisdictions which do not
provide counsel due to lack of resources." Those in the former jurisdiction would be subject to increased imprisonment under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, while those in the latter jurisdiction would not.87
Furthermore, the instant Court's opinion provides clarity to state and
federal courts which had varied and sometimes confused interpretations of
Baldasar.5 The great number of criminal defendants sentenced under
state recidivist statutes or the Federal Sentencing Guidelines will no longer
be uncertain about the constitutionality of using prior uncounseled misdemeanors.89 The opinion also may have repercussions in other areas of
criminal law." By allowing the consideration of a valid uncounseled misdemeanor in the sentencing for a subsequent offense, the instant decision
may be used as authority for allowing a valid uncounseled misdemeanor to
be used for other purposes, such as to impeach a defendant's testimony at
subsequent trials, to revoke probation, parole, or suspended sentence, and
to revoke a driver's license.9'
Although the Nichols decision provides clarity and preserves enhancement statutes by viewing the enhanced sentence as a product of the subsequent conviction,' it does so at the expense of defendant rights. The
Court neglects to thoroughly analyze Sixth Amendment jurisprudence,9 3
and in so doing, severely limits Sixth Amendment rights and contravenes
94
Both cases reasoned that an
the rationale of Scott and Argersinger.
uncounseled misdemeanor is unreliable and as such, should never be the
basis of depriving a defendant of liberty.95 Justice Marshall in Baldasar
recognized that "[a]n uncounseled conviction does not become more reli-

84. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
85. See Fu, supra note 11, at 190.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
89. See Nichols, 114 S.Ct. at 1928 (holding that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, for
which no prison terms was imposed, may be used to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction).
90. See Rudstein, supra note 15, at 542-60.
91. See id.
92. See text accompanying supra notes 79-80.
93. Nichols, 114 S.Ct. at 1937 (Blacknun, J., dissenting).
94. See Rudstein, supra note 15, at 535 (arguing that allowing prior uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions that do not actually result in imprisonment to be used for enhancement purposes contradicts the rationale of Scott and Argersinger).
95. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1933 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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able merely because the accused has been validly convicted of a subsequent offense. 96 After Nichols, an indigent defendant may serve an additional number of years because of an unreliable conviction.97
The instant Court also ignores the deficiencies of the misdemeanor
trial. The Court recognized in Argersinger that the misdemeanor trial is
characterized by insufficient preparation and overcrowded dockets." In
this rushed atmosphere, it is difficult for an uncounseled defendant to
know what procedures to follow and what arguments to make." A conviction under these circumstances may now serve as a basis, whether
directly or indirectly, for additional years of imprisonment.
The instant Court could have avoided narrowing defendant rights
while establishing clarity and maintaining enhancement statutes and judicial economy by overruling Scott instead of Baldasar.'" Under this analysis, the Court could have adopted Justice Blackmun's concurrence in
Baldasar which re-proposed a bright-line test for determining right to
counsel in any criminal case."0 ' This test would require counsel whenever a defendant is charged with a crime statutorily authorizing over six
months imprisonment"2 or whenever a defendant is actually imprisoned.0 3 This rule would give states a clear test to use to determine right
to counsel without the courts having to guess if imprisonment will likely
be imposed. Additionally, this rule would not lead to a substantial nationwide cost increase because many states already provide counsel in all
cases where over six months imprisonment is authorized."° Also, this
rule would recognize defendants' rights. As stated before, a judge would
no longer have to arbitrarily guess whether imprisonment would be likely."05 Most importantly, because indigent defendants would be entitled to

96. Baldasar,446 U.S. at 227-28 (Marshall, J., concurring).
97. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1937 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 34-35 & n.4.
99. Id. at 33-34; see also supra note 13.
100. For an alternative approach available to the Court, see Note, Sixth Amendment Limits on
Collateral Uses of Uncounseled Convictions, 91 YALE L.J. 1000, 1008-17 (1982) (proposing a rule
that would prohibit the collateral use of uncounseled convictions when there is a reasonable alternative
means of advancing the government's interest).
101. See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring); supra note 62.
102. Baldasar,446 U.S. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring); supra note 62 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Any crime punishable by more than six months imprisonment is considered a non-petty offense.
See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 & n.6 (1970).
103. Baldasar,446 U.S. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring); supra note 62.
104. Scott, 440 U.S. at 385-88 & nn.18-21 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that a rule
requiring appointment of counsel for indigents accused of any offense for which imprisonment for any
time is authorized would be unlikely to place too severe a burden on the court system).
105. Cf Scott, 440 U.S. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that a standard which would require counsel when imprisonment is authorized would obviate the necessity to consider the likely
sentence in each individual case and the concomitant problem of inaccurate predictions).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol46/iss3/4

12

Duffy: Criminal Law: Using Prior Uncounseled Misdemeamors to Enhance Pen
CASE COMMENTS

counsel in more situations, there would be a decreased likelihood that an
uncounseled misdemeanor would later be used against a defendant at a
subsequent hearing."°
Thus, by overruling Baldasar instead of Scott, the instant Court neither maximized defendant rights nor provided courts with a bright-line test
for determining when a defendant has a right to counsel. Instead, the instant Court lost a chance to provide clarity at the first misdemeanor level,
and further narrowed the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

106. This conclusion assumes that indigent defendants would be entitled to counsel in more cases
because judges would no longer be given an option of whether to provide counsel when a sentence of
over six months is authorized.
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